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majority felt constrained to uphold the ICC's freedom of action. Here
the Commission seemed bent on frustrating its own procedure for the
disposition of minor matters.4 ' "[C]onstant re-examination and
endless vacillation may become ludicrous, self-defeating. and even
oppressive."-' Surely, the question of whether a small trucker should
be allowed to transport tractors from factory to dealer could be
decided without the full ICC's wisdom. No one would contest the
undesirability of limiting consideration of issues of general
transportation importance to an appellate division. However, the ICC
should be prepared to live with the decisions of its appellate divisions
when it initially elects the procedure designed for review of less
important matters, leaving to the courts the task of correcting any
errors committed by an appellate division. Where a case has
originally reached the highest stages of agency review, is decided by
the agency, the losing party appeals, and the matter is pending in the
courts, stability of regulatory policy is hardly served by an agency
reversal long after the parties thought the decision final. Such
vacillation only invites further appeal by the party who suddenly finds
himself on the losing side and consequent loss in decision-making
efficiency.
Change of Agency Practice Without Adequate Statement of Reasons
In FTC v. Crowther5 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the FTC must fully explain its reasons for
departing from the approach adopted in a previous proceeding which
governed the disclosure of business information usually regarded as
confidential. The Commission had instituted Clayton Act s2 pro-
ceedings against the Lehigh Portland Cement Company challenging
its acquisition of several ready-mix concrete companies. Lehigh
requested that business information be subpoenaed from its
competitors and potential competitors. On a motion by the
competitors to quash the subpoena, the issue narrowed to the
competitors' request that the information be furnished only to an
independent accounting firm for compilation to prevent attribution to
any single company. The examiner felt compelled to follow the
49. 49 ICC ANN. REP. 97; General Policy Statement Concerning Motor Carrier Licensing
Procedures, 31 Fed. Reg. 6600 (1966).
50. Weiss, Administrative Reconsideration: Some Recent Developments in New York, 28
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1262 (1953).
51. 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
52. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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recently established MississippiO formula allowing return to
independent accountants in precisely the manner requested by the
competitors. The Commission apparently did not feel constrained to
follow the Mississippi approach and sent the case back to the
examiner for reexamination.54 A second examiner, 5  on the basis of the
same record, denied the motion to quash the subpoena and substituted
an order that the information be made available to the discovering
company's counsel; the district court granted enforcement. The court
of appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded
for further consideration by the Commission.s
The stated purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to
promote a public policy of fair competition in the marketplace. 57 The
Act establishes the FTC," charges it with the task of effectuating that
policy,59 and authorizes the issuance of investigative subpoenas by the
Commission in its proceedings. 60 FTC rules further provide for the
issuance of subpoenas at the request of any party to an agency
proceeding." In the administration of its subpoena powers, the FTC
has occasionally been challenged when it denied motions to quash
without findings or a statement of reasons.2 Congress clearly
intended to require findings and a statement of reasons only in specific
categories-adjudications and rule-making procedures that result in
final orders of an agency.Y Although it has been generally held that
53. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. T
17,612 (FTC 1966).
54. 430 F.2d at 512.
55. The first examiner was about to retire, and a new examiner was appointed with the
consent of the parties.
56. On remand, the FTC reinstated the provision of the first examiner's order granting
Mississippi treatment but gave respondents the right to obtain full disclosure during the hearing
if they show the requisite need. Although feeling compelled to adopt the Mississippi approach,
the Commission again stressed the fact that the respondent here had retained independent
counsel while the cement company charged in Mississippi was using house counsel. Lehigh
Portland Cement Co., 27 AD. L.2D 659 (FTC 1970).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
58. Id. § 41.
59. Id. § 45(a)(6).
60. Id. § 49. See FTC v. Bowman, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957); FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d
605 (2d Cir. 1957).
61. 16 C.F.R. § 3.34(b)(2) (1970).
62. See, e.g., FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959); FTC v. Waltham Watch
Co., 169 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Neither was successful.
63. APA § 8, 5 U.S.C. § 557 (Supp.V, 1970), provides in the case of rule-making
procedures and adjudications that: "All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative
decisions, . . . shall include a statement of. . .findings and conclusions, and the reasons or
basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion ....
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the doctrine of stare decisis is without significant force in the field of
administrative action, it is well settled that when an agency departs
from prior norms it must articulate its reasons for doing so, or its
action probably will be found to be arbitrary s by a reviewing court.66
While inconsistency in administrative decisions is not necessarily
arbitrary, there is a judicial presumption of arbitrariness in such
cases. 7 Indeed, an agency order, regardless of its relation to prior
agency action, will likely be held to be arbitrary unless it has a
rational and clearly stated basis.6 ' When discretion is exercised in
issuing an order, the agency must disclose its reasoning and show
clearly that the exercise is within congressional authorization;6 9
judicial review is then limited to deciding whether a rational basis and
supporting evidence exist.70 The requirement of findings and reasons is
based on several practical grounds, including facilitation of judicial
review, avoidance of judicial usurpation of administrative functions,
protection against arbitrary action, assistance to parties in planning
their cases for rehearing and judicial review, and confining agencies to
their statutory jurisdictions.7 ' The cease and desist orders of the FTC
result from adjudications and are, therefore, embraced by the
requirement of stated reasons. 72 They are final orders which directly
64. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Optical Workers' Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687
(5th Cir. 1955); State Airlines v. CAB, 174 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Kentucky Broadcasting
Corp. v. FCC, 174 F.2d 38,40 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Dixie Highway Express, Inc. v. United
States, 242 F. Supp. 1016 (D. Miss. 1965); Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 243 F.
Supp. 436 (D. Neb. 1965); U.S.A.C. Transport, Inc. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 689 (D. Del.
1964). But see I B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.403, at 352-53 (2d ed. 1965).
65. Section 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 206(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970), commands courts
which review final rules and orders to reverse them if agency action is, inter alia, arbitrary or
capricious. See generally Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965).
66. Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); Matson Navigation Co.
v. Connor, 258 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also Herbert Harvey v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 684
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth. v. CAB, 231 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
67. NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1941); Dixie Highway Express, Inc. v.
United States, 242 F. Supp. 1016 (D. Miss. 1965).
68. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71 (D. Ky. 1967)
(alternative holding); Matson Navigation Co. v. Connor, 258 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
69. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
70. Gilbertsville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962) (dictum). But see
Matson Navigation Co. v. Connor, 258 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Cal. 1966). Seealso SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961); Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d
116 (2d Cir. 1961).
71. 2 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 16.05 (1958); see Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. See note 63 supra.
Vol. 1971:149]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
affect the parties and effectuate the policies of the Act. However, there
is some authority that a denial of a motion to quash a subpoena is not
such an adjudication and thus is not reviewable. 73
Courts have struggled with the question of whether the particular
agency action sought to be reviewed is within the APA provision
requiring a statement of reasons.7 4 In each of the cases cited as
supporting the requirement of reasons, the court was reviewing agency
action properly classified as a final order.7 And, since the Supreme
Court established the presumption favoring reviewability of
administrative actions, 76 the tests of formality and finality need not be
rigorous. For example, in a recent decision the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held reviewable the refusal of the
SEC to proceed on a complaint which the Commission had felt
insignificant.77 Where administrative subpoenas are concerned, no
cases have been found holding rulings on motions to quash as final
adjudications within the purview of the reasons requirement.78 The
Seventh Circuit has held that FTC denial of a motion to quash
without a hearing or statement of reasons did not violate the
Administrative Procedure Act since a ruling on a motion to quash
was not an adjudication as defined by the A PA.79 That court reasoned
that the action came under the exception which excludes from
adjudications all matters "subject to trial of the law and the facts de
novo in a court. "s Denial of a motion to quash without a hearing has
also been held not to be a denial of due process, since a full hearing
de novo is available at the 'district court level in enforcement
proceedings."' Thus, the requirement of stated reasons varies with the
degree of formality of the administrative proceeding and with the
availability of de novo treatment in court.
The court of appeals in Crowther did not disagree that the
doctrine of. stare decisis is less applicable to administrative agencies
than to courts. However, it noted that its duty under the Ad-
73. FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959).
74. See, e.g., United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960), affd, 368
U.S. 208 (1961).
75. See cases cited notes 66-70 supra.
76. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
77. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. See notes 79-80 infra and accompanying text.
79. FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959).
80. Id. at 436-37.
81. FTC v. Waltbdm Watch Co., 169 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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ministrative Procedure Act and under the directives of the Supreme
Court was to guard against arbitrary and capricious agency action
which results when an agency does not adequately explain its
departure from prior norms.82 After finding a judicial disposition to
accord wide latitude to administrative actions, the court reaffirmed
the necessity of adequate explication of reasons lest the action appear
arbitrary and the review be meaningless. The degree of parallelism of
the facts at bar and those in Mississippi was said to give the parties
and the court the right to a fuller explanation. The FTC argued before
the court that the facts of Mississippi were distinguishable in that the
company attorney in the earlier case had been house counsel, while
Lehigh's counsel was independent. The court, while admitting the
difference could possibly have been important in the agency decision,
found the distinction insignificant, especially as the Commission had
not concerned itself with the distinction in its order denying
Mississippi treatment.Y The court then noted that in the earlier case
the Commission had rejected respondent's argument that an
independent accountant would not be able to easily detect either the
withholding of information or perjury. There had been no claim that
the information would be any less useful because it could not be
attributed to the individual responding companies. The
rationalization by the Commission on appeal that the information
would be as well protected in the hands of independent counsel as if it
were given to independent accountants was rejected as unsupported
and inaccurate. The court pointed out that once the information was
disclosed in the form ordered, there would never be the same degree of
assurance that it would not be disclosed to Lehigh. 4 Similarly, the
additional assurance by Lehigh that it would not oppose in camera
treatment of the information at trial was rejected because there was no
guarantee that the examiner would accord such treatment. The
court's primary instruction on remand to the Commission was to
identify and articulate its reasons for rejecting the approach that it
had so strongly adopted two years before in a nearly identical
proceeding.
Judicial response has always been to require adequate reasons for
agency decisions which affect the rights of parties." It is only proper
82. 430 F.2d at 514.
83. Id. at 514-15.
84. Id. at 515.
85. Id.
86. See cases cited notes 66-68 supra.
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in such cases that the reviewing court have the advantage of all the
expertise and judgment an agency can supply. But the Crowther court
appears to have ignored the basic issue of whether a denial of a motion
to quash a subpoena is even reviewable for alleged agency
arbitrariness. Before remand for a statement of reasons is proper, a
court must find itself permitted to review the action. Agency action on
a motion to quash, because of de novo treatment in the district court,
is exempt from treatment as an adjudication under the APA8' and
thus is not agency action subject to the requirement of a statement of
reasons.8Y The order here in question was not retroactive and had no
binding force in future proceedings; the companies* had no vested
interest in the preservation, of the Mississippi approach without any
deviation whatsoever. Of course the defendant in a Clayton Act action
has a legitimate interest in availing itself of the subpoena powers of
the FTC, and likewise, the subpoenaed companies have an interest in
maintaining their competitive positions. Nevertheless, in the instant
situation more than the conflicting interests of the immediate parties
must be considered. Arguably, the court in Crowther ignored the
public policy consideration militating against delay in the
administrative process. In resolving the conflict between the right of
the public and the parties to know reasons for administrative actions
and the preservation of administrative flexibility in fulfillment of
congressional purposes, courts are repeatedly called upon to balance
interests. An apparently reasonable variation of a formerly approved
ancillary procedure should not be made the cause of unreasonable
delay in effectuating the policies of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Thus, in a subpoena enforcement case, it is arguable that even if
the subpoena order is substantially different from the established
form, once the district court has sustained it, a court of appeals should
affirm in the interest of administrative expediency. A fortiori, in such
a case, a court should not remand for more articulate reasons when
there is not a significant departure from established practice. Both the
court's authority and the wisdom of its decision are questionable.
Agency Decision which Ignores the Examiner's Decision
In Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC89 the Court of
87. APA § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. V, 1970).
88. See FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959). A statement of reasons is
required by the APA only for agency action which qualifies as an adjudication. See note 63
supra.
89. 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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